Malicious Bayesian Congestion Games

In this paper, we introduce malicious Bayesian congestion games as an extension to congestion games where players might act in a malicious way. In such a game each player has two types. Either the player is a rational player seeking to minimize her own delay, or - with a certain probability - the player is malicious in which case her only goal is to disturb the other players as much as possible. We show that such games do in general not possess a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in pure strategies (i.e. a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium). Moreover, given a game, we show that it is NP-complete to decide whether it admits a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium. This result even holds when resource latency functions are linear, each player is malicious with the same probability, and all strategy sets consist of singleton sets. For a slightly more restricted class of malicious Bayesian congestion games, we provide easy checkable properties that are necessary and sufficient for the existence of a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In the second part of the paper we study the impact of the malicious types on the overall performance of the system (i.e. the social cost). To measure this impact, we use the Price of Malice. We provide (tight) bounds on the Price of Malice for an interesting class of malicious Bayesian congestion games. Moreover, we show that for certain congestion games the advent of malicious types can also be beneficial to the system in the sense that the social cost of the worst case equilibrium decreases. We provide a tight bound on the maximum factor by which this happens.Comment: 18 pages, submitted to WAOA'0

Stackelberg strategies and collusion in network games with splittable flow

We study the impact of collusion in network games with splittable flow and focus on the well established price of anarchy as a measure of this impact. We first investigate symmetric load balancing games and show that the price of anarchy is bounded from above by m, where m denotes the number of coalitions. For general networks, we present an instance showing that the price of anarchy is unbounded, even in the case of two coalitions. If latencies are restricted to polynomials, we prove upper bounds on the price of anarchy for general networks, which improve upon the current best ones except for affine latencies. In light of the negative results even for two coalitions, we analyze the effectiveness of Stack-elberg strategies as a means to improve the quality of Nash equilibria. In this setting, an α fraction of the entire demand is first routed centrally by a Stackelberg leader according to a pre-defined Stackelberg strategy and the remaining demand is then routed selfishly by the coalitions (followers). For a single coalitional follower and parallel arcs, we develop an efficiently computable Stackelberg strategy that reduces the price of anarchy to one. For general networks and a single coalitional follower, we show that a simple strategy, called SCALE, reduces the price of anarchy to 1+α. Finally, we investigate SCALE for multiple coalitional followers, general networks, and affine latencies. We present the first known upper bound on the price of anarchy in this case. Our bound smoothly varies between 1.5 when α = 0 and full efficiency when α = 1.

De-amortized Cuckoo Hashing: Provable Worst-Case Performance and Experimental Results

Cuckoo hashing is a highly practical dynamic dictionary: it provides amortized constant insertion time, worst case constant deletion time and lookup time, and good memory utilization. However, with a noticeable probability during the insertion of n elements some insertion requires Ω(log n) time. Whereas such an amortized guarantee may be suitable for some applications, in other applications (such as high-performance routing) this is highly undesirable. Kirsch and Mitzenmacher (Allerton ’07) proposed a de-amortization of cuckoo hashing using queueing techniques that preserve its attractive properties. They demonstrated a significant improvement to the worst case performance of cuckoo hashing via experimental results, but left open the problem of constructing a scheme with provable properties. In this work we present a de-amortization of cuckoo hashing that provably guarantees constant worst case operations. Specifically, for any sequence of polynomially many operations, with overwhelming probability over the randomness of the initialization phase, each operation is performed in constant time. In addition, we present a general approach for proving that the performance guarantees are preserved when using hash functions with limited independenc